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The Political Psychology of Trickster-Clown

An Analytical Experiment
Around Communism as a Myth

AGNES HORVATH

SPS No. 97/5

EUI WORKING PAPERS



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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES



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Printed in Italy in June 1997
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI)
Italy

**The Political Psychology of Trickster-Clown:
An Analytical Experiment around Communism as a Myth**

by
Agnes Horvath

Abstract

This paper argues that the fanatical will and power that hypnotised people in Eastern Europe during Communism was initiated by the activities of a Jungian archetype: the trickster-clown. Furthermore, in comparison with this, the paper develops an alternate figure based on the work of Max Weber: the charismata. Though both types appear among the disturbances of liminal periods, as a response to similar threshold experiences, they carry different messages: those of hate and grace, respectively.

I have been severely attacked by critics
for my ideas of archetypes. I admit at once
that it is a controversial idea and more than a
little perplexing. But I have always
wondered what sort of idea my critics would
have used to characterize the empirical
material in question.
- C. G. Jung

1. Preliminary remarks

A proposal to study the links between politics and collective psyche is bound to be greeted with reserve. This is due to the assumption that collective psyche belongs to psychology or in its spiritual contents to religion and not to politics. Such a first reaction, is however, mistaken, as it is not possible to separate either the collective unconscious¹ from politics or rationality from religion. In his excellent book, Brian Tierney showed how smoothly the religious institutions of the Middle Ages were transformed into modern secular forms, preserving their original substantive spirituality. There is also Weber's similar 'description without definition' in "Economy and Society" about religion, attributing to it the major role in the rationalisation process of the conduct of life.²

¹"The collective unconscious is a reservoir of latent images, usually called *primordial images* by Jung. *Primordial* means "first" or "original"; therefore a primordial image refers to the earliest development of the psyche. Man inherits these images from his ancestral past, a past that includes all of his human ancestors as well as his prehuman or animal ancestors." Calvin S. Hall and Vernon J. Nordby, *A Primer of Jungian Psychology*, Mentor Books: New York, 1973, p. 39.

²Brian Tierney, *Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150-1650*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.; and Max Weber about the conduct of life, *Economy and Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, Ch. IV.

Although it is true that the modern history of politics is the story of its separation from the irrational unconscious, it is also beyond question that the same period witnessed an unprecedented increase of enthusiasm and mobilisation an account of spiritual picture manifestations in the pursuit of political goals. Irrationality was sublimated into the form of political ideologies and mass movements, into the phenomenon of nationalism that still creates such perplexity today, into class struggles, but especially into the form of political revolutions, the most characteristic and unique phenomenon of modern politics,³ and into the totalitarianisms of the 20th century, that have even defined themselves as images of continuous storms and hurricanes in the portrayal of the idea of a "permanent revolution".

However, anybody proposing to reintegrate politics with religion would be treated with just suspicion. The last important theorist attempting to do so was Carl Schmitt, and his fate was unequivocal.⁴ All the same, a prior exclusion of spirituality from politics, on the contrary, would preclude the understanding of modern political history and the extent to which it is still with us. In light of this, it is rather surprising that so few attempts have been made so far to study political spirituality. This paper therefore proposes to rectify this omission by studying its roots.

The point is that spirituality, the volcanic power of the unconscious, has a direct affinity with knowledge, strength and force and with other materialisations of ideas - it is their source. Until now the concern with exactness and concreteness in political science has successfully protected it from involvement in this elemental quality of cosmic furor. However, although there can be

³About this, see Jack A. Goldstone, 'Ideology, Cultural Framework and the Process of Revolution', in *Theory and Society* 20 (1991), 405-53, and Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millenium*, London: Paladin, 1970.

⁴See: Joseph Bendersky, 'Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich', *History of Political Thought* 4 (1983), 579-589.

no political movements without spirituality, not many attempts have been made to gain a scientific understanding of its nature.

This neglect is understandable, as spirituality, or the collective unconscious is so abstract that lies beyond any possible analytical categorisation and thus only mysticism or religion has been able to deal with it. However, on the other hand, its manifestations are so concrete, vivid and lively, and it can be experienced so strongly that political science cannot avoid dealing with it. Thus, while political science has never ceased to deal with the high tension, even ecstasy of significant historical moments, it has studied these in a matter-of-fact way, notwithstanding that its psychic irritability is an allusive, floating phenomenon, lacking concreteness or stability. Political revolutions provide a particularly clear examples of how, in spite of its absurdity, the spiritual can become an objectifying force. When living through changes, one experiences directly the extraordinary, and it is through these events that the political and social world can be changed forever. However, the scientific perceptability used to describe events after the fact is not suitable to understand, explain and capture the volatility of a psychic power that, even if for a short time, has become an effective force in shaping history. This spiritual openness is a peculiar state, when people are in a sort of trance, and when individual interest is forgotten or cancelled. Under the pressure of the intensive presence of a cosmic power self-recognition culminates in the feeling of a common - understood as a unified - consciousness. Under the influence of the unconscious, those possessed can be integrated into a single configuration, to take up the same identity shell.⁵

⁵See in Goebbel's early novel the figure of Michael who goes by chance to a political meeting and immediately falls under the spell of a sinister-wing speaker : "That evening I sit in a big hall with thousand others and see him again, hear him who awakened me. Now he stands in the midst of a loyal congregation, He seems to have grown in stature. There is so much strength in him, and a sea of light gleams from those big blue eyes. I sit among others, and it seems as if he is speaking to me quite personally. About the blessing of work! Whatever I only felt or guessed at, he puts into words. My confession and my faith: here they gain shape. I feel his

It is in politics that concreteness encounters absurdity, and thus dictators and charismatic leaders are born. Nevertheless, spiritual experiences and historical events can also be detached from each other, the first being imaginatively and the second historically significant. In themselves, none of them can solve the paradoxical unity of the spiritual and material world. Thus, even though these are different realms, they cannot exist independently. Being touched by the principle of vitality means moving into a primal situation, into a naked, shattering experience of change, a brutal feeling of the influence or possession of the spiritual collective unconscious. With its harsh and direct impulses, spiritual power transcends the rational and objective world of science. However, since we participate in both modes of existence, we must be able to shift from one context to another and be capable of answering the need for a complimentary relationship between the sacred and the profane. Therefore we need some orientation about the emergence and development of this psychic geyser, since only in this way is it possible to construct systematic knowledge on the repetitive pattern that the outburst of spiritual power follows in the sphere of politics during the periods of transition and change in social existence.

2. Politics and the renewed common psyche

Political science started with Aristotle's *Politics*. Its theme was the description of the common life characteristic of human beings. In terms of facts, it provided nothing particularly new. These ways of being had existed since time eternal. The new phenomenon was that suddenly the self-regulation of the social

strength filling my soul. Here is young Germany, and those who work in the blacksmith's shop of the new Reich. Anvil till now, but hammer before long. Here is my place. Around me people I never saw and I feel like a child as tears well up in my eyes." Joseph Goebbels: Michael: A German Fate through the Pages of a Diary, (1929). In: J. M. Ritchie: *German Literature under National Socialism*, New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1983, p. 42; recalling the characterisation of Stalin by Essad-Bey, quoted later.

unit had become problematic. This rendered visible the basic facts of politics, called for a solution and therefore made systematic theoretical reflection possible. The link between systematic and objective reflection and the chaotic nature of the times was still highly visible in the most important model used by Aristotle, the *Politeia* of Plato.⁶

Greek democracy was a practical attempt to resolve the problem of maintaining political life, while the works of Plato and Aristotle were theoretical. The long-lasting solution for political stability, however, was provided by the Empire. The same answer was repeated with the fall of the Roman Republic, which took place shortly after the completion of the third major political treatise of Antiquity, the Republic of Cicero. Since then, and until our age, we have been living, in the words of Eric Voegelin, "in the age of the Empire".⁷ This solution in the structure of politics was based on the establishment of a set of formal, organisational, structural, institutional arrangements that, together with the force of armies and laws, maintained the framework of politically established ways of being.

However, an Empire is not able either to create or recreate a living community. It can only postpone a crisis by extending itself out of all proportion, until the final collapse. However, at precisely the time when the Roman Empire was being established, and outside politics, a new attempt was made to revitalise the bonds between human beings. This occurred through the emergence of Christianity. From its humble origins in the widespread Empire, it eventually took over the institutions of the Empire after its collapse and was thus able to reinvigorate a dying civilisation.⁸

⁶See: Aristotle, *Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, London: Oxford University Press, 1941.

⁷Eric Voegelin: *Order and History*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974. Vol.4.

⁸See: Charles Norris Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: a study of thought and action from Augustus to Augustine*, London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

The fusion of Christianity and the Roman Empire gave rise to the vision of the "Holy Empire" - a decisive and unifying image of Western politics until 1648, and even beyond.⁹

At this point, the fundamental issue of political science reemerged, giving rise to the classic works by Machiavelli (a contemporary of Luther's) and Hobbes.¹⁰ The question of the creation of a common way of life was posed again, in search for an answer to the collapse of a political order that these thinkers had both witnessed. However, the solution was now different. It was given not by a new religion, but by a new framework based on the survival of the remains of Christianity.

The unifying idea of the Church had collapsed, but the spirit of Christianity had penetrated by that time the population of Europe. Therefore, the "new Empires", as these were manifested in the age of absolutism and divine right kingship, were not simple imitations of the Empires of Antiquity, but could rely upon a different feeling: the existence of sympathy towards fellow human beings, extending beyond the small network of family relations and acquaintances. In this way, once the external, formal framework of the absolutist monarchies was consolidated, after the collapse of the Church and the Holy Empire, it was possible to build a common way life based on a new field, that of the "economy". It is to this new reality that the neologism "political economy" referred, and its correlative would soon be called "civil society", whose science would 200 years later be called (with another neologism) as "sociology".

The basic idea behind political economy, as Adam Smith realised, was that individuals can be allowed to follow their own interests only if there exists a fundamental feeling of sympathy between

⁹See: Quentin Skinner, *The Foundation of Modern Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

¹⁰See: Q. Skinner, R. Tuck, W. Thomas, P. Singer, *Great Political Thinkers: Machiavelli, Hobbes, Mill, Marx*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

them.¹¹ This assumption could only have been valid in a "post-Christian" political entity - as this is understood to mean that Christianity ceased to be a major political actor, but where its presence and impact was still strongly felt. Under such conditions, the external structural framework of the "new Empires" could be softened into mere legal rules of the game where the free play of interest, based on the existing sympathy and the other results of the Christian civilising process, could reign supreme. Thus, the original question of Machiavelli and Hobbes concerning the creation of a political body could be declared excessive and irrelevant. There was no need to go back to a *tabula rasa*. The collapse of the medieval world order did not lead back to a natural state, but to a state where the result of the Christian civilising process could be taken for granted.

However, this dilemma has reappeared in our age, as Joseph Conrad stated it: "The world, the temporal world rests on a few very simple ideas; so simple that they must be as old as the hills. It rests notably, among others, on the idea of Fidelity."¹² Leaving aside for the moment the case of the end of the 19th century, it has appeared with particular strength with the collapse of Communism. Communism destroyed the common way of life, the possibility of politics in all the countries under its reign. However, this destruction is not restricted to the external phenomena of political life, the presence of political parties, parliamentarism, the free press, etc. It has destroyed the very foundations on which such modern institutions are based, the fundamental sense of "sympathy" between human beings, the result of the millennial work of Christianity also. Under such conditions, the old question of politics cannot avoid being posed again.

The very posing of this question has been all but impossible in political science since the times of Locke, Hume and Adam Smith.

¹¹R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, *Adam Smith*, London: Croom Helm, 1982.

¹²Joseph Conrad, *A Personal Record*, Vermont: The Marlboro Press, 1988. pp. 8-9.

There are very few tools available to approach it. In this general paucity of approaches, a major political theorist that has gone back to the classical question, as shown by Wilhelm Hennis, was Max Weber.¹³ The central concept Weber developed for this purpose was charisma, the assimilative and unifying power of spirituality. A study of this concept can help us to shed new light on one of the major events of 20th century politics - Communism - which even in its name attempted to pose once more the problem of community in politics and the reformulation of the common psyche. Through its analysis, a better understanding will be gained of the explosive though integrative force of the collective unconscious.¹⁴

3. Communism as a myth

There is nothing surprising in the claim that Communism was spiritually influenced. It had neither a rational beginning, nor a rational end. Its emergence cannot be traced by the growth in the number of party members or in the slow adaptation of party politics to the rhythm of everyday events.¹⁵ Before W.W.I. in Russia, and W.W.II. in Eastern Europe, Communism was the ideology of an obscure underground sect. After 1989 in Eastern Europe, and after 1991 in Russia, it fell into oblivion within literally weeks, becoming an obscure chapter in history books. But in between, it was the single most influential mass ideology of our age, defining the shape of the century.

¹³See: Wilhelm Hennis, *Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1988.

¹⁴ From the writings of Max Weber, see especially 'The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority', 'The Sociology of Charismatic Authority', 'Meaning of Discipline', 'The Nature of Charismatic Authority and its Routinization', 'The Prophet', 'The Different Roads to Salvation', and 'Science As a Vocation', all collected in S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.), *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.

¹⁵On rapid political changes in the first Communist state without the background of homogeneous movements, see Richard Sakwa: *Soviet Politics*, London: Routledge, 1989.

The elusiveness of its initial moments until its abrupt dissolution is still beyond understanding, and still the most controversial problem of what are called Communist studies.¹⁶ Indeed, far all the books one examines concerning the disappearance of Communism, there are just as many explanations about the unexpected collapse. The various explanations cancel each other out.¹⁷ One can not justify the rapid and wholesale dissolution of Communism in the area by pointing out the ineffectiveness of its economic management, or the break-up of the parties under the pressure of economic and political changes, or even the rise of new social forces of emerging and proposing alternatives.¹⁸

The fact that Communism had no identifiable structure and that it fell so quickly into oblivion suggests that it was as if everything took place in a dream rather than being an experience which was actually lived through. It suggests that communism was a myth, a theme of an archetype, a recurrent and repetitive imitation of pictures, models and visions which were fixed and imprinted in

¹⁶ For some general overviews about the end of Communism, see Ben Fawkes, *The Rise and Fall of Communism in Eastern Europe*, London: Macmillan, 1993, which tries to explain the unusual situation of the Communist party having destroyed its own position; Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1992, according to which the Marxist myth exhausted its power and no social groups remained to perpetuate the political rule; Stephen White, Judy Batt, Paul G. Lewis (eds) *Developments in East European Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1993.

¹⁷ So far there have been very few convincing analyses of the 1989-1991 collapse. About the crisis and the processes of decline in detail, see Michael Waller: *The End of Communist Power Monopoly*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993., and See, Leslie Holmes: *The End of Communist Power*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993.

¹⁸ About this, see Peter Ferdinand: *Communist Regimes in Comparative Perspective, the Evolution of the Soviet, Chinese and Yugoslav Systems*, Hempstead: Harvester, 1991.

the past.¹⁹ Communism existed without any causal determination, as its beginning and its end was rooted in myths.²⁰

It is not sufficient to say that Communism was created from the war, even though the amount of suffering, the collapse of the normal structures of life certainly played crucial role in its emergence, as Communism almost always came into being in postwar conditions.²¹ Nor was Communism solely the sour fruit of Soviet oppression, even though the Soviet military presence was in most cases an important factor in the Communist take-over. The regime nevertheless enjoyed massive popular support from its inception. Many of the changes instigated by the Communist party were popular even after its end. Its leaders were loved and admired and for long decades the parties survived every kinds of internal and external crisis.²² Still, in spite of this support, Communism never ceased to use semi-legal methods to exert

¹⁹ It is not novel idea that Communism can be studied as a myth. See John H. Kautsky: *Communism and the Politics of Development. Persistent Mythes and Changing Behaviour*, New York: Wiley, 1968; Michael Heller: *Cogs in the Wheel*, New York: Knopf, 1988; or Ronald Hill, *Communist Politics under the Knife*, London: Pinter, 1990: "Communism itself has come to be seen as a myth to justify rule by communists" p. 207.

²⁰ Concerning its enigmatic nature, see Aleksa Djilas: "History, which is a mass graveyard of gods that failed, would be hard put to provide another case in which the achievement is in such great contrast to the aspiration. Not only has communism made human beings unfree and in some cases even more unequal than they were before, but it had proved unable to provide for the basic needs, let alone the affluence, of the masses. It restrains innovation and creativity in science, literature and philosophy, and is in permanent opposition to new knowledge. It can not invent new technologies, but primarily imitates and replicates them, and after acquiring them through theft. Further, communism is incapable of creating beauty, be it in an art and architecture or in design and fashion. Further still, it is without a sense of humor, for humor presupposes the ability to observe oneself from a critical distance." 'Dissent in Yugoslavia', in: Vladimir Tismaneanu and Judith Shapiro (eds.) *Debates on the Future of Communism*, London, Macmillan, 1991. p.129.

²¹ See Martin McCauley (ed.) *Communist Power in Europe 1944-1949*, London: Macmillan, 1977.

²² "Stalin has become a symbol. He is, as it were, the spirit on the lonely height, the all-powerful being who watches over everything and whom the subject regards as his last refuge." p. 329 Essad-Bey: *Stalin: The career of a fanatic*, London: Bodley Head, 1932.

power, and even legal measures were supported by shrewd and cunning illegal tricks.²³

Similarly, in searching for the reasons of the successful defeat of Communism, one cannot find more than a few marginalised persons and quasi-intellectuals who formed the opposition and who were often more surprised by the events of 1989 than their defeated enemies, the Communists themselves.²⁴ One has to add to this the more recent surprises in the Eastern European elections, where the former Communists returned everywhere to political power with the exception of the Czech Republic. Instead of a clear-cut causality, one enters a circle of *double entendre* of popular support and coercion, official dissidents and maverick Communists, "refolutions" (T. G. Ash) and velvet revolutions, supported by secret agents from Moscow.

This gives rise to a series of perplexing scenes in which the protagonists really do act and play their roles as if on a stage. So the problem is above all how to transfer the flat silhouette of Communist events into genuine experiences. Experience is a value and it belongs to whatever actually happened. It is located

²³See George Schopflin about Hungary: "The power wielded by the communists was exploited by them on various occasions to their advantage without any legal sanctions. In 1945, for example, the Budapest National Council refused permission for the Christian Democrat-Catholic Party to begin functioning, even though this had the permission of the Prime Minister, Béla Balnoki Miklos. ... However, some of the most spectacular irregularities were carried out during the 1947 election campaign. The Communist struck as many voters whom they suspected of being anti-Communist off the rolls as they could. The result was that something like 400,000 people, about 10 per cent of the electorate, were disfranchised - about 150,000 of them being in Greater Budapest. ... The 'blue ticket' operation was launched to give the Communists a substantial number of extra votes - blue tickets were absent voter certificates - and they were freely issued to communists, who thus voted several times in different electoral districts." in Martin McCauley (ed.) *Communist Power in Europe 1944-1949*, London: Macmillan, 1977. pp. 107-8.

²⁴On the negligible influence of dissent, see Aleksa Djilas, 'Dissent in Yugoslavia and the absence of leading political figure', in Vladimir Tismaneanu and Judith Shapiro (eds.) *Debates on the Future of Communism*

essentially in the memory. But the only concrete reality of Communism that remains now is its seductive confusion which escapes any logic or causality.²⁵ Communism continued to destroy the composure of social and political life, mixed it into a caricature of humanism and democracy, blurred the distinction between representations and facts, reports and events.

This study will examine what has remained and what still lies within the circumference of events: unconscious images and pictures, and their appearance in politics. Communism formulated a second reality and so while it was visible it was not observable - it was sensed but was never factual. Communism was only sensible, just as a dream can be sensed, but appeared without experience. However, its second reality was also empirical, as embodied in those feeling-qualities which gained their full power in mystical perceptions, imaginations and fantasies in the common psyche.²⁶ The terror and the Gulags were the spatial and temporal

²⁵Communism as a lack of experiment in will is the main contribution of Marcel Mauss: "As the Soviets, or rather the Communist Party, have been able to take advantage of and perpetuate this moral isolation of a whole nation, as they have, as it were caged it up, without news, without a press, without freedom of assembly, as they have been able to avoid the elementary oversight of power exercised by public and especially overseas opinion; as they have been able to make Russian masses believe they are still at war with rampant reaction and foreign capitalism, even foreign countries: as everything which is not the state has been destroyed and the state still confronts only soulless and inconsistent mass, for all the reasons the Bolshevik 'experiment' does not seem to me to be proceeding in normal conditions or developing autonomously, in a nation conscious itself and morally and materially healthy....This socialism this 'experiment' lacks the essential feature: will. Russia did not will it and does not yet will it, even if there is nothing else does will." *A Sociological Assessment of Bolshevism*, in Mike Gane (ed.), *A Radical Sociology of Durkheim and Mauss*, London: Routledge, 1992. pp. 183-184.

²⁶See the "second reality" in Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, Yale University Press, 1944. esp. Ch. VII., 'Myth and Religion'; and also Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, New York: Yale University Press, 1946, about the power of its metamorphosis: "Every political action has its special ritual. And since, in the totalitarian state, there is no private sphere, independent of political life, the whole life of man is suddenly inundated by a high tide of new rituals. They are as regular, as rigorous and inexorable as those rituals that we find in primitive societies. Every class, every sex, and every age has a rite of its own. No one could walk in the street, nobody could greet his neighbour or friend without performing a

limits of Communism. They were short and marginal concerning their actual length, but they were the instances through which the silhouette figures of the Communist myth-world began to move and act, like the figures of a mascahal. Eastern Europe still stands suspended at this exit-point, where life ends and each soul follows a solitary path into nothingness.

In this field of second reality we need to trust in our ability to perceive symbols and to learn to use once more metaphors and allegories instead of clinging to the demands of rationality. Communism, however, was not the only political event in the 20th century to be spiritually influenced. Quite the contrary, any liminal or chaotic experience throws up the psychic content of fervorous, delirious pictures and imaginations, and only afterwards does it calm down into a systematised framework of the so-called order. But Communism was peculiar in that it preserved the original hypnotic suggestions. So in the following, a short overview is given of similar threshold experiences in myth formations and their effects on the political psyche in the form of archetypes, that shook up existing certainties and offered solutions for new order-making.

4. Myth.

Karl Kerényi (1897-1976), the well-known scholar of mythology who was born in Budapest and died in emigration in Switzerland. Lecturing extensively at the C. J. Jung Institute, Zurich and publishing works mainly on Greek mythology, he devoted his life to the establishment of a scientific study of myths, saying that "Science herself must throw open the road to mythology that she blocked first with her interpretation and then with her

explanations".²⁷ Kerenyi claimed that only science in the broadest sense, including historical and psychological as well as the cultural and anthropological studies of myths, can help to define our contemporary reality.

For Kerenyi, myths do not have a solid structure. They are always in movement. They have recurrent patterns, yet they are mobile. Myths are always in a state of transformation. Even though they are the embodiments of psychic impulses, they are never experienced, as myths are only subjectifications of concreteness, thus they are imaginary.²⁸ Only in the world of sounds could Kerenyi find a place for mythology, in the sense that myths are the music and the at the same time the composers of the melody. Stagnation and dynamism are the rhythm of the world of illusions, which reveal themselves in the shaping of reality, in accordance with its own autonomous peculiarity and constitutes the stable unity of one and the same phenomenon.²⁹ Myths are variations of meaningful motives and hence are always adequate to their times,

political ritual. And just as in primitive societies the neglect of one of the prescribed rites has meant misery and death. Even in young children this is not regarded as a mere sin of omission. It becomes a crime against the majesty of the leader and the totalitarian state." p. 284.

²⁷See: C. G. Jung and Karl Kerenyi, *Introduction to a Science of Mythology*, London: Routledge, 1970, p. 2.

²⁸The best analysis I have found so far about the double reality, the first that of the experienced and the second that of the imagination is Vilfredo Pareto's book on the concrete, objective struggle between elites and the subjective phenomenon of myth around of them. See Vilfredo Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of the Elites*, Salem, NH: Ayer Co, 1986.

²⁹About reality shaping, see again Cassirer's remarks how the German myth formation of totalitarianism changed the comprehensibility of its language: "If we study our modern political myths and the use that has been made of them, to our great surprise, not only a transformation of all our ethical values but also a transformation of human speech. The magic words takes precedence of the semantic words. If nowadays I happen to read a German book, published in these last ten years, not a political but a theoretical book, a work dealing with philosophical, historical or economic problems - I find to my amazement that I no longer understand the German language. New words have been coined; and even the old ones are used in a new sense, are now used as magic words that are destined to produce certain effects and to stir up certain emotions. Our ordinary words are charged with meanings; but these new-fangled words are charged with feelings and violent passions." *Myth of the State*, p. 283.

like a variation on a musical theme.³⁰ Hence myths are a-structural, they have no experienced history, no beginning and end, only imaginative and floating relevance.

Beyond the musical characteristics of myths, Kerenyi also expressed their picture-like appearance, with the changing sensual developments of the same basic theme. The torrent of mythological pictures that stream outside time is the main topic of Kerenyi's inquiry. However, it is even more relevant that, according to Kerenyi, these pictures and musical sounds are things, objects themselves, with a definite meaning.³¹ The next step on the discovery of the objectivity of myth was made by C. G. Jung, the psychiatrist.

However, before going to Jung, there is a further point made by Kerenyi that is relevant. So far, it has been emphasized that myths are psychic phenomena. However, the pictorial and musical aspects of myths point to an additional view about the source of myths, ie. that they mobilize our primordial background. Myths thus lead back to the place where the two spheres, the eternal past and the living present, coincide, where images stream from

³⁰Among the great number of cases of this subtle state it is sufficient to mention Le Bon's understanding of socialism, according to which "Socialism in its present form is a mental state rather than a doctrine. What makes it so dangerous is not the, as yet very feeble, changes it has produced in the spirit of the populace, but the already very great modifications it has wrought in the spirit of the ruling classes" quoted in David McLennan, *Marxism and Religion*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987, p. 461. This statement can be rendered more precise by the distinction introduced by Durkheim between socialism and Communism, according to which socialism is merely a concern with economic management, while Communism is a fundamentally utopian movement, aiming at a return to an original state of purity. Thus, socialism belong to the prophane, while Communism to the sacred. See Emile Durkheim, *Socialism and Saint Simon*, Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press, 1958, pp. 19, 30, 40-3.

³¹Jacob Talmon's book on political messianism leads us to the same consequences, that the history of political messianism is the state of myth-formation, a particular meaning of the frame of mind, which is more than the simple sum total of response to actual situations, or the compound of interest rationalisation. Jacob Talmon, *Political Messianism*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.

their origin, connecting the primeval period with history, from the earliest times when simplified, one-sided, absolute principles ruled society.³² This statement means that the myth is the mirror of the primordial vision, that in myth is laid out our grounding and our primitive state, and where our emotional atmosphere which surrounds and envelops us is rooted.³³ Because no matter how simplistic it is, the myth is already a rationalisation of basic patterns of feeling.³⁴ This has been studied by C. G. Jung under the form of archetypes.

5. Archetype

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) dealt with the significance of the infinite varieties of psychic phenomena in society and history, through the influence of individual personality. Though he was neither a sociologist, nor a historian, his interpretation of individuality has the very special quality of being constructed in terms of a socio-historical perspective. Jung caused a great stir in medical and scientific circles, as he made concrete the need to go beyond rationalism, recognising the dark hinterland of the mind in the "unconscious", a field of vital and destructive spiritual forces, the underworld of consciousness. With the concept of the unconscious and its concretisation in the archetype, Jung recognised the presence of the irrational in contemporary existence and started the quest for the archaic elements of the

³²Mosca described the communist formation as a blind, unconscious emotional outburst that leads back to a crude, elementary state: "Collectivism and communism, like all doctrines that are based on the passions and the blind faith of the masses, tend to destroy multiplicity of political forces. They would confine all powers to individuals" Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939., p. 292.

³³On how a primeval imagination gets its shape and form through fear and recognition in the present, see Richard Sennett, *Authority*, London, Faber and Faber, 1980.

³⁴Like the traumatic apocalypse myth, this distressing picture-show has had a wide overview from the Ancients to Christians in Norman Cohn, *Cosmos, Chaos and the World to Come*, New York: Yale University Press, 1993.

modern mind.³⁵ The unconscious is the territory of the raw, instinctual energy that merges in a human being into consciousness.³⁶ The primal energy comes up in the form of archetypal symbols, imagination or pictures. The archetype is a behaviour pattern, a situation that 'stamps' us.³⁷ It is a relationship that must render the collective imagination personal, otherwise it does not fulfil its role properly.³⁸ The various archetypal situations are perfectly represented in political science, mainly in the literature on leadership, which presents the different pre-existing pictures that force individuals to act in a politically specified and guided way.³⁹

Thus, the archetype revitalises the primordial emotional state, which is a prior stage in the evolution of the myth. Therefore, if the question is how the myth of Communism was formed, what its elementary foundation was, or what the basic structural elements of the communist myth systematisation process were, then

³⁵See the excellent part of Michels' book on the psychological metamorphosis of the leaders towards archaic images, like the desire to dominate and guide, the recognition of superiority, and the fulfillment of directing spirit. Robert Michels, *Political Parties, a Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, London: Macmillan, 1962.

³⁶About possible productions, see Pareto: "In regard to derivations, there is not a great deal of difference between the mystery of the Holy Trinity and Marx's theory of surplus value: between loathing of the Great Enemy of the mankind and loathing of capitalism. In regard to substance, medieval theocracy's aim was to get control of the central power, but by no means to destroy it; indeed, albeit without deliberate intentions, it promoted the central power. Classical socialism also aims at getting control of the central power, which it intends to use as to control economic life in its entirety." 'Reconstruction of central power and intellectual revaluation' in Vilfredo Pareto: *Sociological Writing*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966. p. 314.

³⁷See Max Weber, 'The Social Psychology of the World Religions', in: Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber*, London: Routledge, 1948.

³⁸The most expressive example on the hatred image of Communism so far is from the correspondence between Marx and Lassalle: "The thing to do now is instill poison wherever possible" in Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, p. 479.

³⁹For further details in political science, see Bernard M. Bass: *Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership*, New York: The Free Press, 1981. about the different types and functions of leadership. and Jean Blondel, *World Leaders*, London: Sage, 1980.

Kerenyi's conceptualisation of myth, like the Jungian concepts of archetype and the collective unconscious, is of particular help.⁴⁰

The analysis will start with the concept of "charisma", in order to demonstrate the presence of the type of spiritual power to which it alludes, the gift of grace, and will then contrast it with a radically different, revengeful archetypal figure, the "trickster". The opposition of these archetypes is a peculiar manifestation of the imaginative power of the unconscious. The two spiritual archetypes help the recognition of each other, as charisma is visible only in the mirror of its opposite, and vice versa. In each other's mutual reflections both charisma and the trickster will gain a lively picture.

The agents or canalisers of the activation of archetypal images are a favorite topic of sciences, although they are not usually classified under this label. They have been called charismatic persons in Weber's sociology, clowns in anthrophology⁴¹, quasi-charismatic persons in Lindholm's overview⁴², spell-binders in political science,⁴³ and special mental disorderers in Jung's psychoanalysis.⁴⁴

To begin with, only numinosity, the spiritual power that stimulates the archetypal picture, will be assumed. Visions need guiders or magicians — agents who impose their vision on the audience and who are able repeat and stabilize the imaginations, the pictures emerging from the unconscious. They are reflexivity makers, as they are themselves the electric wires of sensitivities,

⁴⁰Also we should mention Gaetano Mosca's already cited work on the ruling class as a phenomenon that is partly effected by historical causes, but also by myths around the objectification of formulated illusions.

⁴¹Don Handelman, *Models and Mirrors. Towards and Anthropology of Public Events*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

⁴²Charles Lindholm, *Charisma.*, Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1990.

⁴³Ann Ruth Willner, *Spellbinders. Charismatic Political Leadership*, New York: Yale University Press, 1983.

⁴⁴C.G.Jung, *The Collective Works of C.G.Jung*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, Vol. 1.

which also segregates them from the rest of the society. These transformers are unique human beings, as the inspiration of the unconscious leaves its special stamp on them. The blank face, the sheer lighting eyes are the specific psychic dispositions characteristic of their appearance, as has been amply described by a number of works about the charismatas,⁴⁵ totalitarian leaders,⁴⁶ mediums,⁴⁷ clowns and tricksters who also act as agents of spiritual power.⁴⁸ A rigid mask surrounds the person, who hides behind it so as not to disturb the free flow of unconscious stream.⁴⁹

If the power-canaliser is a politician, then his office is to permanently fulfil the role of power-making. He is recognized and acknowledged as a distinct leader with a unique power to release and channel energy for the sake of the common good. If these 'dry' types are the representatives of a frivolous, demonic dynamism, then they are manifestations of the archetype of the clown,⁵⁰ like the fairy-tale figures or Tom Thumb or Stupid Hans, and various other folk characters.⁵¹ They have a fondness for sly jokes and malicious pranks. They have a dual nature, being half-divine, associated with healing power and intimations of salvation, and half exposed to ridicule and even torture.⁵² This figure is a combination of primitive brutality and dynamic energy and power, and an identification with him gives one the sense of the superhuman or the god-like. His power emerges from a complete submission to instinct, from the pain released through the intense discomfort of this submission, from the animosity and hatred

⁴⁵Nietzsche noticed the rigidity of the overman, so he claimed that the final task of the higher man is to learn how to laugh.

⁴⁶See the most often cited author: Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979.

⁴⁷C.G.Jung, *On the Psychology and Pathology of the So-Called Occult Phenomena*, Vol.1.

⁴⁸C.G. Jung, *On the Psychology of the Trickster-Figure*, Vol.9./1

⁴⁹C.G.Jung, *The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease*, Vol. 3.

⁵⁰Handelman op.cit.

⁵¹C.G.Jung, *Two Essays*, Vol 7. p. 29.

⁵²C.G.Jung, Vol.9/1. p.255.

which easily gives rise to brutal solutions of self-sacrifice. The elements of the unconscious gain their energy and force toward their way to consciousness through a continuous self-abandonment, hence self-denial indicates the gentle and painless slipping back into the pleasurable state of irresponsibility, the loss of the firmness of an autonomous existence.⁵³ This blissful state of submission is reached through ceremonies and rituals.

Under the notion of charisma as a type of legitimate authority, Max Weber introduced another spiritually influenced power-formation into political science.⁵⁴ Although he detached the notion from its original theological usage, it has never lost its transcendental meaning as a divinely inspired grace. Weber was especially interested in those moments of the emergence of spirituality when the belief in regularities, in order and its organisational basis are in dissolution. This state of fermentation is also central to the purposes of this paper, as charisma is an authority that is derived not from office, but from the capacity of a particular person to maintain faith in himself as a source of legitimacy and who could capture the imagination and enthusiasm of a public, as the source of revitalisation against ossification. The 'touch of supernatural', the possession by spiritual power is a specifically innovative, non-routinised force, an exclusive source of authority, connected to a person who asserts his own sense of mission against the demands of tradition, law and order, an irritating innovator who burns in his own flames. The effect of such persons on their social and political environment under "out-of-order" conditions is enormous, as in this way they can fulfil

⁵³See the National Socialist state-leader's words as the embodiment of collective spirit: "There will be no licence, no free space, in which the individual belongs to himself...The day of individual happiness has passed. Instead we shall feel a collective happiness. Can there be any greater happiness than a National Socialist meeting in which speakers and audience feel as one? It is the happiness of sharing. Only the early Christian could have felt it with equal intensity. They, too, sacrificed their personal happiness for the higher happiness of the community." J. M. Ritchie, *German Literature under National Socialism*, p.112.

⁵⁴Max Weber, *Economy and Society*.

their task of reordering the social and political framework of the community.

However, this irrational influence is a delicate point in Weber's view. While the non-rational irritability due to the endangered state of stability mobilises the unconscious, stimulates energies, generates enthusiasm and renews vitality, the events may turn out to be quite different from the gift of grace, the quality of charisma. Spirituality stirs up feelings, beliefs, faith in reforms, in nation-building or in the restoration of Volk, in the resuscitation of order or the serving of the community, or in any other salvation from crisis without giving any charismatic guarantee. This latter is an extraordinarily effective power emanating from supernatural forces, but the relaxation of social control turns attention away from the strengthening of common bonds toward an obscure end. The mobilisation of the irrationality of the unconscious - the power of feelings, enthusiasms, zeal and faith - is geared towards the creation of authority that was suspended. Whatever the case may be, the enchanter stands in the middle of a storm, whether accepting Weber's concept of charisma or going further in the political psychology. The only fixed meaning in his concept is the personal spell of the extraordinary, the distinctive ability to enchant followers by means of suggestivity. However, it is useful at this point to give more details about this personality on whom the spiritual content is passing through.

The main point here concerns the magnificent flowering of pictures, just like a series of video-clips, that come from the authentic strength of the leader, whose possessed sensuality is able to "capture" the mind. The different combinations of images that appear on the screen of events are determined by their mobiliser, by the person who is giving form to the new volitions. Returning to Weber, charisma is not the product of collective needs, values, crises or negotiated actions. It is bound to the

peculiar character who bears the weight of spiritual influence.⁵⁵ But greatness is a mystery, it is based more on devoted feelings than on sober judgments, thus the understanding of charisma in reality still remains an enigma.⁵⁶

Neither fame or success, nor faith, belief, or power exhaust the archetypal manifestation of the "gift of the grace" or charisma in a particular person. It is not easy to recognize who has charisma.⁵⁷ The looseness of the concept has made it into one of the most elusive categories in political science. It has not helped the understanding of charismatic leadership that the combination of traits that enables an individual to induce others to accomplish a given task was called hypnotic 'suggestion'. In fact, this has led to a number of approaches trying to explain the political sense of charisma.

These fall into two categories. One focuses on the individual characteristics of certain persons, presumed to have charisma, and proposes psychological explanations for these.⁵⁸ The other puts the emphasis on certain political regimes that are supposed to give rise to charismatic leaders⁵⁹. However, neither the psychologising theories nor the literature on totalitarianism alone could give a proper description of the spiritual type of legitimate authority, although both make important contributions to the topic. In the following, a new approach will be offered, where charisma and its counterpart, the trickster as a unconsciously originated picture-image will be used.

⁵⁵See also Ann Ruth Willner, *Spellbinders. Charismatic Political Leadership*, New York: Yale University Press, 1983.

⁵⁶ See Jacob Burchardt: 'The Great Men of History', in *Reflections on History*, Indianapolis: Liberty Classic, 1979.

⁵⁷See the most criticized use of his concept of charisma, by Weber where he mentioned as a charismatic leader the name of a leader of the communist experiment in Bavaria in 1919 Kurt Eisner. See Eisenstadt (ed.), *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*, p. 49.

⁵⁸ See one of the best of this type: Charles Lindholm, *Charisma*.

⁵⁹Juan J. Linz, An Authoritarian regime in Spain. in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan, (eds.), *Mass Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1970.

Let us take the example of one of these subversive symbolic types, the clown and the function that he fulfills. The anthropologist Don Handelman gives us a fully-fledged description of this peculiar character. He suggests that, first, there are affinities between the clown type and ideas of process, and, second, that these types are opposed to deity figures, though in their composition they themselves combine contradictory evil and godlike features: they oscillate between poles of terror and righteousness, disorder and order, violence and playfulness. They appear during transformative processes, such as rites of passage (Van Gennep), weddings, folk festivals associated with seasonal changes, and in other liminal situations, and are therefore able to mould the existing context into their own logic.⁶⁰ They have an enormous power to destabilize and dissolving the context and to subordinate their audience to their autonomous internal logic of disorder, as this type dissolves all boundaries.

The role of the clown is to bring people into contact with the unconscious, to lift them from the solidity of the mundane to the fluidity of the spiritual, questioning the existing framework of order.⁶¹ The trickster type carries the idea of liminality in itself, as it is out of place on either the mundane or the spiritual side of the existing order. Therefore, it is able to make contact with its audience through the unconscious.⁶²

⁶⁰ Arnold Van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1960.

⁶¹ See as a peculiar experiment of bringing the clown into politics Ralph Dahrendorf: "The power of the fool lies in his freedom with respect to the hierarchy of the social order, that is he speaks from outside as well as from inside it. The fool belongs to the social order and yet does not commit himself to it; he can without fear even speak uncomfortable truth about it." Ralph Dahrendorf, 'The Intellectual and Society, The Social Function of the "Fool" in the Twentieth Century', in Philip Rieff (ed.), *On Intellectuals*, New York: Doubleday, 1969, p. 54.

⁶² See V. Turner's definition on liminality, Victor Turner, *From Ritual to Theatre*, New York: PAJ Publication, 1982.

However, one should not forget that both Jung and Handelman concluded their account with an important caveat. They called attention to the fact that these archetypes can be converted. This means that, on the one hand, trickster figures can easily transform themselves into charismata; or, on the other hand, that their type serves as a bridge toward charisma, the pure candida⁶³ - thus clowns or slaves are the reanimators of the glorius state of consciousness, moving towards the integration of opposites. Therefore the corrosive elements - the destroyers or deformers, the embodiments of maleficent power - are also the indispensable components of transformative purification. Hence there is an ultimate contact between types: the archetype of perfection, the homogeneous and the deeply stable charisma, and the archetype of the double figure of the clown are reconciled.

The godlike perfection and the ambivalent, playful figure of the trickster exchange attributes of type. Handelman has studied the performances in which the laughing clowns suddenly became serious, the sober candida enjoyed the escatological tales, and the clowns received gifts that signalled the generative union of order and energy. The types interact fully, each becoming more similar to the other while retaining its own typification. Perhaps a meta-type of fruitful unity emerges in the sacred center to guide this conjunction. In any case, the idea of a vital impulse, of 'process', is bent voluntarily to that of order, so that each is integrated harmoniously with the other.⁶⁴ The transformation of the total experience of the unity of being can only come from repressed immoral impulses, from the colour of sin and misery. It is often forgotten that meekness comes from arrogance, peace from torture, and that "one step above the sublime makes the

⁶³See C.G.Jung, *Alchemical Studies*, Vol 13.

⁶⁴A similar description of union we should get from alchemical processes. See C.G.Jung, *Alchemical Studies*, Vol 13.

ridiculous, and that one step above the ridiculous makes the sublime again".⁶⁵

Evil demands confession, so without the mirror of sin the good would suffocate in their own dry perfection. If these archetypes are activated, then the spiritual outburst brings joy and happiness, and all of its love and merriness makes up for the painful inadequacies, infantile emotions and all-consuming drive for possession. The easiness of the finally achieved union with the unconscious gives the same sensual ecstasy both for tricksters and charismatas.

If these archetypes, or even only one of them, are activated, then their effects depend on the way that consciousness reacts to the situation. The projection of the unconscious, and the manifestation of its power is also inherent in charismatas also. Both tricksters and charismatas are impressive in their own way, with projections underlying their energetic appearance. There is no doubt that communist leaders have never configured the attributes of the charisma. However, it does not mean automatically that they belong to the other type.⁶⁶ Charisma is one possible archetype in the various picture manifestations of the unconscious, but it exists only when in constant contact and interpenetration with the clown-trickster type. Just as charismatic unity and reconciliation are indispensable without differentiation, dissolution by the trickster is also measured by order.

6. Pictures in the myth of communism

Our study aims to use the concept of archetype in order to interpret Communism as a myth configured around primordial

⁶⁵ See Thomas Paine, 'The Age of Reason', in *Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

⁶⁶ See the strong argument against the charismatic attributes of communist leaders in Zbigniew Brezinski, 'The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration', in Zbigniew Brezinski (ed.), *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.

suggestions and visions. In this way Communism can be reconstructed even using limited materials, which are themselves inherently impulsive imaginations, like political speeches.⁶⁷ With the official Communist discourse, one enters a world from which all the wealth of detail has been removed, which is deprived of naturality and definitiveness, and is rather an emotional complex formed under hermetic intimacy. The political talks were those small and precisely portioned units of the self-presentation of Communism that were called for in order to keep listeners up to date about the state of affairs, the events happening behind the curtains, where the audience could freely follow the fantasy-world of the speeches, undisturbed by the events outside the scene. This paper argues that it is worthwhile investigating the representation and imagination of Communism, analysing the words of its political figures, once confidence was lost in the relational concreteness of this type of regime. Once the made-up reality disappeared around these figures, one is at least able to handle the myth around them.

The words of Communist leaders are usually not taken seriously, though they are themselves modes of thought, they transmit pictures and project visions, conjure dreams and manifest suggestions, and so they are explicitly suitable for analysis.

One can most easily recognize the transferences and transformations from the energy of the unconscious through certain archetypes into a particular product of myth in the speeches from the time of the Communist takeover. The dynamics and intensity of the energy depended upon the reconciliability of the images with the archetype and the sensitivity or reflexivity of the audience towards the projection. Thus, in that period, the situation was particularly suitable for identification with the

⁶⁷On imagination as a method for analysing political phenomena see Richard Sennett, 'Charismatic De-Legitimation: A Case Study', *Theory and Society*, Summer 1975, Vol. 2. No. 2., where Sennett used Giralomo Savanarola's case for defining the test of divine authority

picture through the archetype. If the archetypal picture found its spectators - if they fitted each other and were mutually resonant with each other - then the consequence was a full-scale liberation of sympathy, giving further strength and power to the political myth.⁶⁸ Otherwise the delirious, unintelligible and merely suggestive content of the unconscious would simply have remained where it belonged, in the sphere of the irrational and the shadowy background of existence. In post-war times, listeners were the captives of this spiritual motion, transforming suggestions and insinuations into events as they perceived and reacted upon the suggestions. Therefore the Communist leaders with their speeches were the "initiators" who called forth the archetypal figures, while the audience was the transformer of the communist myth into objectivity.⁶⁹

⁶⁸See the culmination of self-recognition in the feeling of *communitas* in the role of Stalin: "To him alone belongs the power in Russia, and he shares it with no one, not even with his closest comrade-in-arms. He alone knows all that is happenings throughout his vast realm and tells his assistants what he thinks necessary. The rest he keeps for himself. This makes him indispensable, and the Communists are fully aware that the fall of Stalin will involve the fall of the system, if only because there is no one who holds the key to the whole of Russia or Stalin does." Essad-Bey, *op.cit.*, p. 377.

⁶⁹This process is similar for religious formation. For some examples of the various identifications of communism with religion, see N. Berdiaev: "If communism is opposed to all religions, it is less in the name of the social system that it embodies than because it is itself a religion. For it wishes to be a religion fit to replace Christianity, it claims to answer the religious aspirations of the human sort and give a meaning to life. Communism sees itself as universal, it wishes to control all existence and not simply some of its aspects", cited by David McLellan: *Marxism and Religion*, London: Macmillan Press, 1987. or J. Monnerot about the communism as a "technological messianism" or a "twentieth-century Islam", "communism takes the field both as a secular religion and as a universal State; it is therefore more comparable to Islam than to the Universal Religion which began opposing the Universal State in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds, and which can be said to have drawn men's hearts away from the State itself. Its voracity is extraordinary. As universal State it would abolish all the differentiations which keep the world divided into distinct and individual units (the most recent unit of this kind is the nation); and as a secular religion it canalises discontent, organises and reinforces every impulse that sets men against their native society, and works pertinaciously to aid, abet, and accelerate the self-division and secession of part of their own vital force which plunge societies into dissolution and ruin". Jules Monnerot, *Sociology of Communism*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976. p. 19.

Communist speeches aimed at an audience that was initially only an indifferent, neutral screen onto which the silhouette-like figures of the speeches were projected. However, by evoking the sentiments of their listeners, the speakers were able to shape them according to their own dramatic suggestions and vision. Thus, by studying the images conjured up by the speeches, it is possible to identify the archetype that pushed members of the audience to build their existence around these archetypal suggestions, and to shape their actions in that particular way. It was in this way that the trickster/charismatic figure became plastic. These archetypes were embodiments of the autonomous power of the unconscious at the moment in which its power appeared on the threshold and touched the listeners.

At this moment, Jung went further, addressing the question of what happens when unconscious power crosses the threshold and seizes the personality. The problem of hypnotic possession is a central interest of political psychology. So the aim is to investigate how archetypal motifs appear in political speeches, and in what forms of common vision the objectivisation of unconscious energy takes place in a community. Tracing the paths of the topography of the underworld is an important task in order to studying the successfully impersonification of the unconscious either as a demonic force or a life-maintaining energy. Only the moment of emergence will be treated, when the autonomous power of the dark hinterland took on its shape and form in the Communist political speeches: the further developments in the evolution of communism will not be followed, as this rehearsal which lasted for forty years was simply an imitative record of the already founded logic of an infinite dramatic play of the trickster-clown.⁷⁰

⁷⁰About repetitiveness in the different national cases, see Ferenc Fejto, *A History of People's Democracies*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974. especially 'Introduction: Stalinism at its Apogee and in Decline', pp. 7-25.

In conclusion, it should be emphasised that for Jung the spiritual (or the visual, hallucinatory) side of being is empirical. It is generally present in our selves and it is held collectively in society. However the essence of this dynamic and demiurgic force, with its amorphous appearance in pictures, could only be objectivised into archetypes on the basis of a reduced intensity of consciousness. This is because the reactivation of archaic images is due to disturbances of the mind and a loss of control, and so it is usually characteristic of a war-like existence.⁷¹ The reduced intensity of attention, and passive and humble behaviour is characteristic of post-war societies, which are the main creators of myths, going back to the Iliad.⁷²

7. Conclusion

All situations that call for emotional responses and therefore give access to the unconscious are violent, as they break the closed gate between the material and the spiritual life.⁷³ Indeed, such archetypal figures, like trickster and charismata always appear in periods of disturbance. Of course, disruption and crisis belong to the normal turning points of life. However, the violent interruption of the unconscious into human affairs is the transmission of the chthonic from the underworld where things do not hold together, where only horror is considered as valid, and it

⁷¹Jan Patocka points out with a similar intention that the state of war creates a spiritual atmosphere and becomes a spiritual power of 'liberation' in the sense of cynical demoralisation, and of the solidarity of the shattered: "there is something profoundly and mysteriously positive. It is not the attraction of the abyss or the romantic nature of adventure, or even some perversion of natural sentiments. The man at the front is gradually overcome by a feeling of meaningfulness, although it is difficult to verbalize". 'Wars of the 20th century and the 20th century as war', *Telos* (1977), 30: 120.

⁷²About the fermentative effect of the lost war on social structures see Elemer Hankiss, *East European Alternatives*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Ch. 1. 'The Paralysed Society, 1948-1965'.

⁷³This outburst of the unconscious and its violent attack on the prophets was called a rape - a sudden unmotivated occurrence of torment, leading to the suffering of terrible pains and the heavy pressure of heat. See Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, New York: The Free Press, 1952.

gives rise to archetypal motifs - the mixture of creative and destructive elements, a certain amount of ambivalent enchantment and danger. The assimilation of the unconscious content into different pictures of archetypes can occur through different types of rationalisation, such as myth, rituals, religion or science.

According to Weber, the three forms of legitimate authority - traditional, rational-legal and charismatic - are different types of response to the violence of the unconscious, three possible types of control or obstacle to its inflation, but only the charismatic has an effect on the spirituality. This is the reason why communism cannot be easily accommodated in the Weberian conceptual scheme: it has never able to step over the shadow of the unconscious, and so it remained a ghost-like state, without any historical memory, without the slightest stamp of concreteness in its birth, although it showed fake marks of the spiritual spell from the beginning.

Communism remained on the magical state of the threshold, falling victim to the pictures and suggestions of the initial archetype. However, this is the main reason why the Communist phenomenon maintained its fascination, as it seemed to have been existed behind glass on a mysteriously undefined level, where no sounds or noises trace the interactions among groups and parties, the sight of contours is broken and the unforgettable awkwardness of Communism that shocked both its adherents and opponents is due to a genuine concern with nonsense given by the figure of the trickster. The growing sense of dread can be systematised in a unique archetypal figure, in the animation of trickster-clown in this nightmare scene. During its whole existence, Communism was able to successfully preserve the chronic, corrosive dryness in its own original purity, in the calligraphic representation of the artificially incited energy of the clown-like trickster.



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